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SECURING CRYPTO: EXEMPTING CERTAIN 
CRYPTOASSETS FROM THE ARKANSAS 
SECURITIES ACT 
Jesse Kloss* 
INTRODUCTION 
Out of fifty states in 2019, Arkansas was ranked forty-fourth 
for technology and innovation with a grade of “F,” thirty-sixth for 
economy with a grade of “D+,” and thirty-seventh  for business 
friendliness with a grade of “D+.”1  It is time to make Arkansas 
an innovation and business friendly state.  Exempting certain fully 
functional cryptoassets, those that have some purpose other than 
a speculative or investment purpose, from the Arkansas Securities 
Act is one step towards doing so. 
This Comment suggests that the Arkansas legislature should 
adopt an exemption from the Arkansas Securities Act for these 
cryptoassets.  Exempting these cryptoassets from state securities 
laws would be a step towards establishing an innovation-friendly 
regulatory environment in the State of Arkansas, and if the State 
acts quickly, could make Arkansas a leading state in this area.2  
This Comment will provide a brief background on cryptoassets3 
for those new to the topic, including a survey of current 
* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Arkansas School of Law.  The author thanks Carol
Rose Goforth, Clayton N. Little Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, 
for her inspiration to research this topic and invaluable guidance in writing this Comment, 
the Arkansas Law Review editorial board and staff editors for their indispensable editing 
assistance, and her family for their unwavering support and encouragement.  
1. Top States 2019: Overall Ranking, CNBC (July 10, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3YJF-
EHDG]. 
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. This Comment will refer to “cryptoassets,” a term intended to be broader than
“cryptocurrencies.”  Cryptoassets are a digital asset class, defined as “digital assets in which 
cryptographic techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of the asset and to verify 
their transfer between parties via a blockchain without a central party,” and include more 
than currency substitutes.  Cryptocurrencies and Cryptoassets: Managing the New Asset 
Class, EY, [https://perma.cc/H4UA-5RDJ] (last visited Sept. 9, 2020). 
632 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:3 
cryptoassets, provide an overview of Arkansas securities 
regulations, explain why most fully functional cryptoassets likely 
constitute securities under the Arkansas Securities Act, and 
survey recent legislation in other states exempting certain 
cryptoassets from state securities laws.  This Comment will then 
argue that fully functional cryptoassets should be exempted to 
create greater regulatory certainty and an innovation-friendly 
regulatory environment to secure capital, jobs, and revenue for 
the State of Arkansas.  
I. WHAT ARE CRYPTOASSETS?
A. Coins versus Tokens
Cryptoassets are a digital asset class whereby “cryptographic 
techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of the asset 
and to verify their transfer between parties via a blockchain 
without a central party.”
4
  There are thousands of different 
cryptoassets on the market, over 5,300 as of April 2020.
5
  
Cryptoassets are usually categorized as either coins or tokens.
6
  
Coins are native to their own blockchain and often have features 
that are similar to government backed money, or fiat currency.
7
  
Digital coins may act as a currency, with no real function other 
than serving as a way to transfer value, store value, or act as a unit 
of account
8
 and operate “independently of other platforms.”
9
 
Tokens, by contrast, are created on already existing 
blockchains, and are often used within the “ecosystem” of a 
particular project, such as those used within decentralized 
4. Id.
5. All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, [https://perma.cc/6EHK-SA3N] (last
visited April 22, 2020). 
6. See Stephen O’Neal, Differences Between Tokens, Coins and Virtual Currencies,
Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (July 29, 2019), [https://perma.cc/33JS-3WBM]. 
7. Id.
8. Laura M., Token vs Coin: What’s the Difference?, BITDEGREE (Sept.. 8, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/797D-QRJL]. 
9. Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients About
Crypto-transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47, 66 (2019) (citing Difference Between 
Cryptocurrency Coins and Tokens, CRYPTONIAM (Dec. 5, 2017), [https://perma.cc/9A4W-
V77P]). 
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applications, or “dApps.”
10
  DApps connect users directly and do 
not require a middleman to function, as centralized apps like Uber 
and Gmail do.
11
  Ethereum, a popular cryptoasset, allows 
developers to run dApps on the Ethereum platform, and some 
have dubbed Ethereum “the Mother of [dA]pps.”
12
  The Ethereum 
white paper groups dApps into three primary categories: apps for 
managing money, “apps where money is involved (but also 
require[] another piece)”, and apps classified as “other,” such as 
those involving “voting and governance systems.”
13
  Tokens 
often give the holder the ability to participate in the network and 
may be used for payment inside the ecosystem, represent shares, 
or give the holder access to some aspect of the project.
14
 
B. Bitcoin
A familiar digital coin is bitcoin.  The Bitcoin white paper 
was published in 2008 by the still anonymous Satoshi 
Nakamoto.
15
  Bitcoin was launched as a peer-to-peer “electronic 
cash” system based on a cryptographic proof designed to replace 
professional financial institutions that serve as third-party 
intermediaries between two transacting parties in conventional 
transactions.
16
  Bitcoin differed from the earlier attempts at 
creating digital currencies, such as Flooz, Beenz, and Digicash 
which appeared in the 1990s,
17
 because Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer 
network that uses a proof-of-work protocol,
18
 whereas earlier 
10. O’Neal, supra note 6; Laura M., supra note 8.
11. What is a Decentralized Application?, COINDESK (July 23, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/TQ39-WDWA]. 
12. What Are Dapps? The New Decentralized Future, BLOCKGEEKS,
[https://perma.cc/2KKN-6ND3] (last visited Sept. 9, 2020). 
13. COINDESK, supra note 11.
14. Bonpay, What Is the Difference Between Coins and Tokens?, MEDIUM (Mar. 13,
2018), [https://perma.cc/7QQM-4FF5]. 
15. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM,
(2008), [https://perma.cc/3GUT-9PHB]; see also Marie Huillet, 11 Years Ago Today Satoshi 
Nakamoto Published the Bitcoin White Paper, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 31, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/Q3YC-C88Z]. 
16. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 15.
17. What is Cryptocurrency. Guide for Beginners, COINTELEGRAPH,
[https://perma.cc/Q529-TYEU] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020). 
18. Proof-of-work protocol is a consensus protocol used in a decentralized, peer-to-
peer network like Bitcoin and other early coins.  Goforth, supra note 9, at 90. 
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unsuccessful versions used the “Trusted Third Party approach.”
19
  
The reason Bitcoin was considered innovative is that the Bitcoin 
blockchain solved the “double spend” problem without relying on 
a trusted third-party intermediary to verify transactions.
20
  
The double-spend problem arises because without accurate 
and trusted record keeping, the same amount can be spent twice 
by the same holder.
21
  Bitcoin relied on an innovative “proof-of-
work” consensus protocol to resolve the double-spend issue 
without third-party intermediaries by allowing participants in the 
network to verify transactions using blockchain technology to 
timestamp groups of transactions and broadcast them across the 
network.
22
   
A few terms must be defined in order to understand how this 
transaction verification process works.  Nodes are computers in 
the network that relay information across the network.
23
  Some 
nodes act as “miners,” which serve the important purpose of 
generating and maintaining the history of bitcoin transactions by 
solving complex “proof-of-work” math problems.
24
  Recent 
transactions are compiled into blocks and at the end of each block 
is a complicated math problem that miners work to solve.
25
  When 
a miner solves the problem, the result is two-fold: the block of 
validated transactions is added to the blockchain and the miner is 
rewarded with bitcoin, which is the process by which new 
bitcoins are generated.
26
 
In addition to avoiding the problems of having to pay and 
wait for an intermediary to act, Bitcoin also offers users a certain 
19. COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 17.  The Trusted Third-Party Approach means that
the security protocol is controlled by a third party.  Nick Szabo, Trusted Third Parties are 
Security Holes, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INSTITUTE (2001), [https://perma.cc/7MUW-CAYA]. 
20. Harsh Agrawal, What is Double Spending & How Does Bitcoin Handle It?,
COINSUTRA (Nov. 6, 2019), [https://perma.cc/M8KA-HBQR]. 
21. Team InnerQuest Online, How Does a Blockchain Prevent Double-Spending of
Bitcoins?, MEDIUM (Aug. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4MB9-76Q8]. 
22. COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 17; Andrew Tar, Proof-of-Work, Explained,
COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 17, 2018), [https://perma.cc/77TR-WX5T]. 
23. Alyssa Hertig, How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK (July 8, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/95BZ-QU6K]. 
24. Id.; Nolan Bauerle, How Does Blockchain Technology Work?, COINDESK (July 19,
2017), [https://perma.cc/RHN6-36BX]. 
25. Goforth, supra note 9, at 89.
26. COINDESK, supra note 23.
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layer of privacy.
27
  While it is true that distributed ledger 
technology requires that transactions must be public, public keys 
are anonymous.
28
  This means that anyone can see that an amount 
is being sent between two parties, but the actual identities of the 
parties remain anonymous.
29
  
However, while transacting with bitcoin may not result in 
the purchaser’s name and physical address being made public, 
their identity can still be determined using information like an IP 
address.
30
  It is probably more accurate to say that bitcoin 
transactions are pseudo-anonymous.
31
  Users wanting to remain 
truly anonymous have a few options.  One way is through a 
process known as “Bitcoin mixing,” which tries to destroy 
traceability by “creating temporary addresses or by swapping 
coins with other addresses of the same value.”
32
  There are other 
coins which offer greater privacy that will be discussed in the 
privacy coin section of this Comment.   
C. The Emergence of Altcoins
In determining whether cryptoassets are securities, it is 
necessary to understand that there are various other cryptoassets 
on the market besides bitcoin.
33
  Each of these cryptoassets are 
distinguishable in a number of important ways.
34
  The first 
cryptoassets that arose after bitcoin were known as “altcoins.”
35
  
Altcoins can differ from bitcoin in many ways, such as by using 
a different economic model, a different method for distributing 
coins, a different mining algorithm, by offering “more versatile 
programming language” so that applications can be built on the 
27. See Protect Your Privacy, BITCOIN, [https://perma.cc/EAG2-G2SN] (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020). 
28. NAKAMOTO, supra note 15, at 6.
29. Id.
30. Harsh Agrawal, 6 Ways To Make Untraceable Bitcoin Transactions, COINSUTRA
(Aug. 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5YL7-FZKA]. 
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone
Should Read, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017), [https://perma.cc/RM2H-KYBE]. 
34. See CryptoAsset Classifications, INTELLIGENT TRADING FOUND.,
[https://perma.cc/A7UD-J8BZ] (last visited Aug. 29, 2020). 
35. Marr, supra note 33.
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blockchain, or by offering a greater level of privacy, among 
others.
36
   
These so-called “altcoins,” digital coins designed to serve as 
alternatives to bitcoin, began to emerge in 2011.
37
  Altcoins 
attempted to change and improve on some aspect of the process 
used in bitcoin transactions, such as by offering increased speed 
or greater anonymity for users.
38
  Some of the first rivals to 
emerge were Namecoin and Litecoin.
39
   
The Ethereum platform was created in 2015 and its native 
currency is ether.
40
  Ether is marketed as “‘digital money’ that can 
be sent over the internet instantly and cheaply.”
41
  Ether is 
consistently the second most highly capitalized cryptoasset 
behind bitcoin.
42
  Ethereum mining is similar to Bitcoin mining, 
and “problems” are usually solved every twelve seconds, 
broadcasting the block across the network for validation and 
rewarding the successful problem solver with ether.
43
  Like 
Bitcoin, Ethereum is not controlled by a “company or centralized 
organization” and is instead “maintained and improved over time 
by a diverse global community of contributors.”
44
  The Ethereum 
platform is different from Bitcoin in that it allows developers to 
build applications and technologies on top of its blockchain.
45
   
The Ethereum platform allows for the trading of ether and it 
uses blockchain-based smart contracts to facilitate these 
transactions.
46
  A smart contract is a computer protocol that 
digitally facilitates, verifies, or enforces transactions without the 
36. What Is an Altcoin?, BITCOIN MAG., [https://perma.cc/CSK4-N8VK] (last visited
Aug. 29, 2020). 
37. Marr, supra note 33.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See What Is Ether (ETH)?, ETHEREUM, [https://perma.cc/3AD3-8NTT] (last
visited Aug. 29, 2020). 
41. How To Buy Ether (ETH), MYCRYPTO (July 1, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HX5J-
DMZB]. 
42. Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, COINMARKETCAP,
[https://perma.cc/RCY6-4QM2] (last visited Aug. 31, 2020). 
43. Alyssa Hertig, How Ethereum Mining Works, COINDESK (July 13, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/9Y77-7Q7L]. 
44. Ethereum, FACEBOOK (June 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GGM8-SCDS].
45. COINDESK, supra note 11.
46. Marr, supra note 33.
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need for third parties.
47
  A smart contract completes transactions 
with cryptographic code.
48
   
The Arkansas legislature took the step to define a smart 
contract in 2019,
49
 joining a number of other states that have taken 
similar action.
50
  Arkansas law defines a smart contract as 
“[b]usiness logic that runs on a blockchain; or” “[a] software 
program that stores rules on a shared and replicated ledger and 
uses the stored rules for:” “[n]egotiating the terms of a contract;” 
“[a]utomatically verifying the contract;” “and [e]xecuting the 
terms of a contract.”
51
  While it is positive that the Arkansas 
legislature is looking into the crypto space, this bill received a 
great deal of criticism from the blockchain community, 
particularly for specifying that smart contracts are enforceable 
commercial contracts.
52
 
The XRP token is another well-known cryptoasset.
53
  XRP 
is used to transfer value across the Ripple Network, and it acts as 
a mediator for crypto and fiat currency exchanges.
54
  Ripple 
markets itself as a global payments network that “enable[s] 
financial institutions to send money across borders, instantly, 
reliably and for fractions of a penny.”
55
  Ripple uses its own 
unique patented technology, the Ripple protocol consensus 
algorithm (RPCA), to facilitate transactions.
56
  Whether it is 
appropriate to classify the XRP token as a cryptoasset is 
controversial.
57
  Some have argued that Ripple is not a true 
47. Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The Blockchain Technology That Will Replace
Lawyers, BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/D5WV-B5XZ] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
48. Alyssa Hertig, How Do Ethereum Smart Contracts Work?, COINDESK (July 13,
2020), [https://perma.cc/5BSF-DYNW]. 
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122 (2019); H.B. 1944, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ark. 2019). 
50. Jonathan A. Beckham & Maria Sendra, Smart Contracts Lead the Way to
Blockchain Implementation, GREENBERG TRAURIG 2 (Dec. 2, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/8JXX-76ET].  
51. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122; Ark. H.B. 1944.
52. See infra Part II.D.ii.
53. What Is Ripple. Everything You Need to Know, COINTELEGRAPH,
[https://perma.cc/ZLX8-GKVU] (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). 
54. Id.
55. Our Company, RIPPLE, [https://perma.cc/74EJ-4VTW] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
56. COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 53.
57. Joe Liebkind, Why Some Claim Ripple Isn’t a ‘Real’ Cryptocurrency, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 24, 2017), [https://perma.cc/YYC8-FE84]. 
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cryptoasset at all because it is not decentralized and is instead 
controlled by one company.
58
   
In fact, because of the central role the Ripple company plays 
in the control and maintenance of the XRP tokens, plaintiffs in a 
California class action have alleged that XRP tokens are securities 
and Ripple violated state and federal securities laws by failing to 
register XRP offerings with the State of California or the SEC.
59
  
Supporting plaintiff’s proposition is the fact that Ripple has a 
great deal of control over the flow of XRP because Ripple owns 
the majority of XRP tokens and chooses when to release them 
from its escrow service,
60
 and due to Ripple’s 2014 
implementation of what is known as the “balance freeze” 
feature.
61
  This feature allows Ripple to freeze or confiscate XRP 
from any user, a feature apparently created to aid compliance with 
regulatory actions such as a court-ordered confiscation of funds.
62
  
Ripple’s motion to dismiss the case was denied on February 26, 
2020, so it remains possible that XRP could be classified as a 
security under state or federal law.
63
  
D. Privacy Coins
Some cryptoassets are specifically designed to offer users 
optimal privacy and anonymity.
64
  One such privacy coin is 
monero.
65
  Monero markets itself as “electronic cash that allows 
fast, inexpensive payments to and from anywhere in the world.”
66
  
The Monero ledger allows users to send and receive transactions 
58. Mix, Ripple (XRP) Is Centralized and Terribly Flawed, Researchers Say, HARD 
FORK (Feb. 6, 2018), [https://perma.cc/YYF4-F57T]. 
59. Zakinov v. Ripple Labs, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 3d 950, 952 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
60. Stephen O’Neal, XRP Fork Unlikely to Succeed, Ripple Continues to Face Angry
Investors, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 15, 2019), [https://perma.cc/97KJ-K642]. 
61. The Ripple Story, BITMEX RESEARCH 6 (Feb. 6, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7GXX-
RQQL]. 
62. Id.
63. Zakinov v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 70, slip op. at *23 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2020).
64. Taylor Armerding, IMF Wants to Pierce the Blockchain Anonymity
Veil, SYNOPSYS (Apr. 3, 2018), [https://perma.cc/8MB7-2MWP]. 
65. Id.
66. What Is Monero (XMR)?, MONERO, [https://perma.cc/PE89-JRT6] (last visited
Apr. 22, 2020). 
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and no one else can see the sender, amount, or the destination.
67
  
It is virtually impossible to link monero to previous transactions 
because sending and receiving addresses are hidden in every 
Monero transaction.
68
   
Zcash is another popular privacy coin.
69
  Zcash shields 
addresses and balances from being visible on the blockchain.
70
  
One difference between Monero and Zcash is that all Monero 
transactions are private, whereas Zcash allows the user to choose 
if their address or transaction is transparent.
71
  Zcash users choose 
whether or not the sender and recipient are private or public.
72
  
There are a number of additional differences between Monero and 
Zcash regarding their underlying protocols, cryptography, and the 
way each is mined
73
, but both are classified as privacy coins.
74
 
E. Stablecoins
Stablecoins are cryptoassets that are tied to another fungible 
asset, such as fiat currencies like the U.S. dollar, or other 
established cryptoassets.
75
  Pegging a cryptoasset to another asset 
is done for the purpose of stabilizing price volatility.
76
  Bitcoin is 
not backed by any other currency, any government, or any other 
asset, and its value is volatile as a result.
77
  
67. Aaron Mangal, What Is Monero (XMR)? An In-Depth Guide to the Privacy Coin,
COINCENTRAL (Jan. 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/H67P-W83N]. 
68. See MONERO, supra note 66.
69. Rajarshi Mitra, Zcash vs. Monero: Comparative Privacy Coin Guide,
BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/FDR6-2JEH] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
70. The Basics, ZCASH, [https://perma.cc/FM7U-FDLA] (last visited April 22, 2020).
71. Id.; Mitra, supra note 69.
72. Mitra, supra note 69; ZCASH, supra note 70.
73. For more information regarding the technical differences between Zcash and
Monero, see Mitra, supra note 69. 
74. See id.
75. Connor Blenkinsop, Stablecoins, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH, (Apr. 30, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/EQ5K-J684]. 
76. Id.
77. See COINMARKETCAP, supra note 5, for information on the value of bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies over time.  For a material example of just how volatile bitcoin prices 
can be, look no further than the “Bitcoin pizza guy,” Laszlo Hanyecz, who infamously 
purchased two Papa John’s pizzas for 10,000 Bitcoin in 2010.  That 10,000 Bitcoin, which 
was worth pennies in 2010, has been worth as much as eighty million dollars in recent years. 
Molly Jane Zuckerman, Bitcoin Pizza Guy: Laszlo Hanyecz on Why Bitcoin Is Still the Only 
Flavor of Crypto for Him, COINTELEGRAPH (May 27, 2018), [https://perma.cc/8G4D-
3Z9W].   
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In many ways, stablecoins aim to be more like the U.S. dollar 
or other fiat currencies.
78
  Stablecoins offer the aspects of crypto 
that are popular, like transparency, security, speed, low fees, and 
privacy, while offering the best aspect of traditional payments 
methods, like trust and stability.
79
  There are many potential 
benefits from adopting stablecoins.  A secure digital currency 
could make cross-border transactions cheaper and more efficient, 
improve financial planning, and serve as a financial tool for the 
underbanked.
80
   
There are a few different ways to create a stablecoin peg.  A 
company itself could hold the collateral, which are known as 
collateralized stablecoins.
81
  Another option is an algorithmic peg, 
where a smart contract essentially acts as a central bank and alters 
the amount of the stablecoin in circulation so that it is always 
correctly pegged to the underlying asset.
82
   
Tether is a popular stablecoin.
83
  Tether is marketed as 
“traditional currency on the Blockchain.”
84
  Tether can be pegged 
to U.S. dollars, euros, or Chinese yuans.
85
  Reeve Collins, CEO 
of Tether, described Tether as “a dollar that works on the 
blockchain.”
86
  The Tether website states that “[o]ne Tether 
equals one underlying unit of the currency backing it, e.g., the 
U.S. Dollar, and is backed 100% by actual assets in the Tether 
platform’s reserve account.”
87
  Tether periodically publishes a 
record of its reserve balances.
88
 
A proposed stablecoin that has been in recent headlines is 
libra, the proposed cryptoasset developed by the makers of 
78. What Are Stablecoins?, CB INSIGHTS 1, [https://perma.cc/NXB8-7ZFX].
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Ofir Beigel, The Complete Beginner’s Guide to Stablecoins, 99BITCOINS (May 4,
2020), [https://perma.cc/L84D-BV7M]. 
82. Id.
83. See Blenkinsop, supra note 75.
84. Why Use Tether?, TETHER, [https://perma.cc/224Y-29Y5] (last visited Aug. 28,
2020). 
85. FAQs, TETHER, [https://perma.cc/GNU4-DSNJ] (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
86. Pete Rizzo, Realcoin Rebrands as ‘Tether’ to Avoid Altcoin Association, COINDESK
(Nov. 20, 2014), [https://perma.cc/BS2Q-7AMX]. 
87. About Us, TETHER, [https://perma.cc/65P3-W3ML] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
88. Transparency, TETHER, [https://perma.cc/4FER-DKAQ] (last visited Sept. 11,
2020). 
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Facebook.
89
  The original Libra White Paper published in June 
2019 said that libra would be pegged to “a basket of global 
currencies.”
90
  The white paper was updated in April 2020, now 
stating that libra will be pegged to singular currencies rather than 
“a basket of global currencies,” largely in response to concerns 
that libra could affect monetary sovereignty and monetary 
policy.
91
  The problem identified in the Libra White Paper is that 
“1.7 billion adults globally remain outside of the financial system 
with no access to a traditional bank” yet one billion people own 
mobile phones and half a billion have access to the internet, which 
Libra intends to solve by increasing financial inclusion.
92
   
A difference between Libra and many other cryptoassets is 
that Libra, as proposed, will not be decentralized in the same way 
as other cryptoassets.
93
  The Libra Association is Libra’s 
governing body, described as an independent, not-for-profit 
organization responsible for “facilitate[ing] the operation of the 
Libra payment system,” coordinating among stakeholders, and 
managing the Libra Reserve.
94
  The Libra Association is made up 
of many prominent organizations from various industries, 
including the aforementioned Facebook, which is primarily 
responsible for generating the project, as well as Lyft, Spotify, 
Uber, Coinbase, Mercy Corps, and others.
95
   
89. Kari Paul, Libra: Facebook Launches Cryptocurrency in Bid to Shake up Global
Finance, THE GUARDIAN (June 18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4WN5-GAMY]. 
90. Richard Meyer, Facebook Reveals Libra Crypto’s Currency Basket Breakdown:
Report, COINDESK (Sept. 23, 2019), [https://perma.cc/VLJ7-FFMZ]; White Paper, LIBRA 
ASS’N 1 (Apr. 2020), [https://perma.cc/L6E5-T33G]. 
91. LIBRA ASS’N, supra note 90, at 1-2.
92. Id. at 4.
93. See id. at 24.
94. Id.
95. The Libra Association, LIBRA, [https://perma.cc/79D8-R2L2] (last visited Sept. 1,
2020).  However, eBay, Mastercard, Visa, and PayPal, among others, have withdrawn from 
the Libra project due in part to scrutiny from government regulators.  Lauren Feiner, 
Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency Coalition Is Falling Apart as eBay, Visa, Mastercard and 
Stripe Jump Ship, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2019), [https://perma.cc/5N7W-62NR].  
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F. Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) and Security Token
Offerings: A Distinction with Little Difference
An Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is a way for a company
marketing a new cryptoasset to raise capital from investors, and 
the new crypto is usually purchased with fiat money or other 
existing cryptoassets.
96
  J.R. Willett is accredited with holding 
one of the first ICOs, which was for Mastercoin.
97
  Willett 
presented the concept of an ICO as:  
a bunch of trustworthy guys . . . that people have heard of 
[who] say, okay, we’re going to do this.  We’re going to 
make a new protocol layer.  It’s going to have new features 
X, Y and Z on top of bitcoin, and here’s who we are and 
here’s our plan, and here’s our bitcoin address, and anybody 
who sends coins to this address owns a piece of our new 
protocol.98   
In 2013, the Mastercoin ICO raised 5,000 bitcoin, a value of 
$500,000 at the time.
99
   
ICOs are a fundraising mechanism and a way to attract 
investors to a new crypto project.
100
  The way that ICOs often 
work is that a company will submit a white paper describing the 
new crypto project and the problem that it is seeking to solve and 
readers can then decide to invest in the project.
101
  When someone 
invests money in an ICO, they are often providing money for the 
completion of the project, so it is perhaps more accurate to think 
of ICOs as an opportunity to invest in the idea of a project rather 
than investing in the project itself, at least in situations where 
funds raised go towards project completion.
102
  Frequently, the 
96. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd. v. Alibabacoin Found., No. 18-CV-2897 (JPO), 2018
WL 2022626, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 2018). 
97. Chris Abraham, The Origin Story of the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) Token Sale
History, NEWCONOMY (Oct. 13, 2018), [https://perma.cc/BW7E-TS3U]. 
98. Id.
99. Howard Marks, The ICO Is Dead. Long Live the ICO 2.0, HACKERNOON (Feb. 21,
2018), [https://perma.cc/2QPQ-UMN9]. 
100. Ameer Rosic, What Is An Initial Coin Offering? Raising Millions in Seconds,
BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/A9M2-884M] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
101. Id.
102. Id.
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new cryptoassets offered in an ICO are issued for either bitcoin 
or ether.
103
   
ICO’s became popular in 2017, a year in which $5.6 billion 
was raised, catapulting into 2018, where $7 billion was raised in 
the first quarter alone.
104
  ICO popularity took a strong downward 
tick starting in June 2018.
105
  There are a few explanations for 
why ICO popularity has declined.  The first reason is the inherent 
risks involved in investing in an ICO, which some have called 
“the new Digital Wild West.”
106
  One study found that more than 
eighty percent of ICOs conducted in 2017 were scams.
107
  It is 
pretty simple to create a fraudulent ICO: come up with a fake but 
conceivable proposal or omit key facts making the proposal seem 
important and intricate, when in actuality it is not.
108
   
Why would someone invest in such a seemingly risky 
venture?  The potential gain is enormous if the coin turns out to 
be successful.
109
  If the coin operates as promised or the value of 
the coin increases, early purchasers can make significant gains.
110
  
During the Ethereum ICO, one ether traded for forty to fifty 
cents.
111
  Ether traded for as much as $1,417.38 in 2018, achieving 
a 13,000% increase in value in that year alone.
112
   
Another explanation for the decreasing popularity of ICOs, 
the most relevant to the scope of this Comment, is the regulatory 
concerns with ICOs.
113
  Perhaps the phrase Initial Coin Offering 
(ICO) sounds familiar.  ICOs are both phonetically and 
conceptually similar to an Initial Public Offering (IPO), whereby 
a company sells shares of capital stock to the general public for 
103. What Is An ICO?, BITCOIN MAG., [https://perma.cc/4MWW-8R49] (last visited
Sept. 11, 2020). 
104. The State of the Token Market 9 Months into 2018, FABRIC VENTURES 8,
[https://perma.cc/9WF5-5A6W] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
105. Id.
106. Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion
of Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 898 (2018). 
107. Ana Alexandre, New Study Says 80 Percent of ICOs Conducted in 2017 Were
Scams, COINTELEGRAPH (July 13, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LG5Y-AGTD]. 
108. Rosic, supra note 100.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Arjun Kharpal, Ethereum Hits a Fresh Record High and Is Up Over 13,000% in
a Year, CNBC (Jan. 10, 2018), [https://perma.cc/YX32-JNZR]. 
113. Robinson II, supra note 106, at 898, 955-56, 960.
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the first time.
114
  IPOs are securities offerings registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
115
  
The SEC has suggested that ICOs often constitute securities 
offerings, regardless of whether the token or coin itself would 
constitute a security once it is fully functional.
116
  This is because 
with many ICO investors are providing money for the completion 
of the project in which offerors continue to play an active role.
117
  
The SAFT, or Simple Agreement for Future Tokens, Project was 
a proposal for creating a token sale compliant with securities 
laws.
118
  While the SAFT Project focuses on the federal securities 
laws and the investment contract test from the United Stated 
Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Company,119 its distinction 
between pre-functional and functional tokens is pertinent to this 
Comment:  
Unlike a pre-functional token . . . whose market value is 
determined predominantly by the efforts of the sellers in 
imbuing the tokens with functionality, a genuinely 
functional token’s value is determined by a variety of market 
factors, the aggregate impact of which likely predominates 
the “efforts of others.”  Sellers of already-functional tokens 
have likely already expended the “essential” managerial 
efforts that might otherwise satisfy the Howey test.120 
To reiterate the point, even if the token offered would not be 
considered a security once it is functional, it can be and probably 
is a security when offered through an ICO, because most ICOs 
sell pre-functional tokens, or contractual rights to acquire the 
tokens when they are functional, rather than the actual tokens 
themselves.
121
  ICOs of this sort should be registered with 
114. BITCOIN MAG., supra note 103; Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, SEC, OFF.
OF INV. EDUC. AND ADVOC. 1, [https://perma.cc/FMP4-UCUE] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020). 
115. SEC, supra note 114, at 1.
116. See JUAN BATIZ-BENET ET AL., THE SAFT PROJECT: TOWARD A COMPLIANT
TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK 11 (2017), [https://perma.cc/EQA9-UXVT]; Spotlight on Initial 
Coin Offerings (ICOs), SEC (Jan. 7, 2020), [https://perma.cc/CCK9-2R52].  
117. See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 116, at 11.
118. Id. at 15.
119. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
120. Id. at 1-2.
121. See James J. Park, When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the
Perplexed, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 20, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/XN4C-DBY3].  
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securities regulators and investors need the protection of the 
securities laws in this space.
122
  While this Comment will not 
focus on how the SEC has regulated cryptoassets and ICOs to 
date, it is important to understand that the SEC certainly has ICOs 
on its radar and has found that most ICOs are securities 
offerings.
123
   
Tokenized securities, or security tokens, are cryptoassets 
that are specifically designed to function like traditional 
securities.
124
  Security tokens represent interests in a business 
venture and may provide certain rights to investors, including 
equity, the right to receive dividends, profit-sharing rights, voting 
rights, etc.
125
  Security tokens may be offered through Security 
Token Offerings (STOs), which are either registered with the 
relevant securities regulators or structured to comply with an 
exemption; they are generally understood to be securities by the 
transacting parties.
126
  The label STO is not universally used, with 
some such offerings still being referred to as ICOs, but in the case 
of tokenized securities, the term is understood to refer to a legally 
compliant, licensed distribution, registered with or exempt from 
registration by the appropriate securities regulators.
127
  Security 
tokens and offerings of security tokens are understood to fit 
within the current securities laws to the blockchain industry and 
generally minimize investor risk as compared to noncompliant 
ICOs.
128
   
Many think STOs could serve as the bridge between 
traditional finance and the blockchain world.
129
  While some 
token creators will want to avoid being classified as securities, 
there are benefits to being regulated in certain circumstances, 
such as with security tokens, because they offer investors a 
122. See id.
123. For more information on how the SEC has regulated crypto, see SEC, supra note
114. 
124. David Petersson, What Are Tokenized Securities and Why They Matter, FORBES
(Mar. 27, 2019), [https://perma.cc/H7XH-GM5M]. 
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Tim Fries, STOs v. ICOs: What’s the Difference?, THE TOKENIST (Sept. 15,
2019), [https://perma.cc/9AMT-HN2X]. 
128. Id.
129. Id.
646 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:3 
greater level of security, as the “security token” label aptly 
implies.
130
  Legally compliant offerings of security tokens should 
be encouraged and allowed to flourish.  This is a promising way 
the traditional financial system is adopting this innovative 
technology.  
This Comment will not argue that security tokens should be 
exempted from the Arkansas Securities Act because they are 
intended to be securities, gain legitimacy from regulation, and it 
would not be in the State’s or the transacting parties’ interests to 
exempt tokenized securities from state securities laws.
131
  This 
Comment suggests that fully functional cryptoassets other than 
tokenized securities should be exempted from Arkansas securities 
laws to ensure that Arkansas is a pro-innovation, pro-technology, 
and pro-business state. 
G. Utility Tokens versus Security Tokens
Some cryptoassets have no function other than serving as a 
substitute for currency, conventional debt, or equity securities, or 
they derive their value from an external, tradable asset.
132
  These 
are the kind of tokens that are most often agreed to be subject to 
securities laws.
133
  Some sources lump all of these into the 
category of “security token,” meaning only these tokens should 
be regulated as securities.
134
  Note that tokenized securities, as 
that phrase is used in this Comment, are one kind of security 
token, but other kinds of crypto may also be security tokens.
135
  
The lack of precision in this particular label is one reason that this 
Comment does not use it.  
Lawmakers and writers in the crypto space often have a 
special category for tokens that are not seen as being within the 
130. Complete Guide to Security Tokens: How They Work Explained Simply, THE
TOKENIST, [https://perma.cc/9M3C-AC6H] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
131. See id; Fries, supra note 127.
132. Toshendra Kumar Sharma, Security Tokens vs. Utility Tokens: A Concise Guide,
BLOCKCHAIN COUNCIL (Sept. 6, 2019), [https://perma.cc/VZ8S-LJSD]; Katalyse.io, 
Security Tokens vs. Utility Tokens - How Different Are They?, HACKERNOON (Sept. 25, 
2018), [https://perma.cc/D7BN-2LMT]. 
133. Sharma, supra note 132.
134. See Rajarshi Mitra, Utility Tokens vs Security Tokens: Learn the Difference -
Ultimate Guide, BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/3JSQ-ZUKE] (last visited Sept. 12, 2020). 
135. See id.
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scope of traditional securities laws; these are often referred to as 
functional utility tokens.
136
  These utility tokens, often associated 
with smart contracts and dApps, have some inherent utility or 
functionality other than acting as a currency substitute or 
speculative investment.
137
  Utility tokens have been defined as 
“entity-specific crypto-assets that have some utility within the 
software application or platform being developed.”
138
  There are 
a number of functions which could constitute “utility,” including 
giving users access to the underlying blockchain, access to digital 
goods, access to a specific good or service, digital representation 
of a different financial asset (stablecoins), or fundraising.
139
  
Utility tokens may allow users to pay for specific services like 
cloud storage or access to an internet browser with no 
advertisements.
140
  Utility tokens are not created to function like 
investments.
141
   
When it comes to how the securities regulators determine if 
a token is a security, the federal court’s approach is governed by 
the Howey investment contract test, and it should be clear that the 
SEC and the courts will not assume a token is outside of the 
securities laws just because it is labeled as a utility token.
142
  
However, there are some useful analogies from the Howey case 
for understanding utility tokens.   
In Howey, the W.J. Howey Company and Howey-in-the-
Hills Service, Inc. were Florida corporations that offered 
prospective customers land-sales contracts and service contracts 
136. See, e.g., Sharma, supra note 132; Nate Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings as
Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?, 67 UNIV. KAN. L. REV. 
379, 392-94 (2018); Mitra, supra note 134; Rachel Wolfson, U.S. State Of Wyoming Defines 
Cryptocurrency ‘Utility Tokens’ As New Asset Class, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/XYN9-RZSS].  
137. Laura M., supra note 8.
138. Robinson II, supra note 106; see also Laura Shin, Are ICOs for Utility Tokens
Selling Securities? Prominent Crypto Players Say Yes, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/Q834-P5UZ]. 
139. What Are Utility Tokens, and How Will They Be Regulated?, SFOX (Dec. 29,
2018), [https://perma.cc/ST7R-UD3E]. 
140. Park, supra note 121.
141. Katalyse.io, supra note 132.
142. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); “ICOs, or more specifically tokens,
can be called a variety of names, but merely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it 
to provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a security.”  SEC, supra note 
114.
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for citrus acreage.
143
  The Court handed down the famous Howey 
test to determine if an arrangement is an investment contract: an 
investment contract exists when a person invests money in a 
common enterprise and expects profits solely from the efforts of 
a third party.
144
   
It is common sense that while the Howey contracts were 
securities under this investment contract test, the Court never held 
that the tangible oranges themselves constituted securities.
145
  In 
the crypto context, pre-functional tokens
146
 offered through ICOs, 
where money given is used to fund the completion of the project, 
likely constitute a security offering, but the functional token itself, 
once completed, is not necessarily a security by virtue of the fact 
that the ICO constituted a security offering.
147
 
However, this Comment does not argue for solely using the 
utility token versus security token distinction because the labels 
are so often arbitrarily applied.
148
  A token could have some 
“utility” and nonetheless be considered a security under federal 
or state law.
149
  A pre-functional utility token offered through an 
ICO is almost certainly a security offering, even though the 
underlying token might qualify as a “utility token” upon 
completion.
150
  To address this, this Comment instead argues for 
distinguishing based on functionality for offering exemptions 
from state securities laws.  Once a cryptoasset is functional, it 
would qualify for an exemption, so long as it is not explicitly 
marketed on the basis of speculation in value.  
143. Howey, 328 U.S. at 294-95.
144. Id. at 298-99.
145. Scott Kupor & Sonal Chokshi, Analogies, the Big Picture, and Considerations for
Regulating Crypto, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (May 4, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LY7F-
Z9R6]. 
146. Pre-functional tokens are tokens which do not, at present, have a consumptive
use.  They are not functional in the way that they will be once the project is complete.  See 
BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 116, at 11.  This distinction between pre-functional and 
functional tokens matters for the application of the securities laws.  “I think almost all pre-
functional tokens result in a security per U.S. law,” said Marco Santori, a prominent lawyer 
in the blockchain space.  Shin, supra note 138.  
147. See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 116, at 1-2, 9-12; Shin, supra note 138.
148. See supra Part I.G.
149. SEC, supra note 114.
150. See Shin, supra note 138.
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II. ARKANSAS SECURITIES LAWS AND CRYPTO
A. The Arkansas Securities Act
Under the Arkansas Securities Act (“the Act”), there is a 
long list of arrangements that constitute a security, but the one 
that matters for the purpose of this Comment is an investment 
contract.
151
  It is unlawful, and a Class D felony in Arkansas, to 
knowingly offer or sell unregistered and nonexempt securities.
152
  
It is a Class A misdemeanor to negligently offer or sell 
unregistered and nonexempt securities.
153
  There are also civil 
penalties involved with the sale of unregistered and nonexempt 
securities and a buyer of an unregistered and nonexempt security 
may recover costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, plus the 
consideration paid for the security and six percent interest per 
year from the date of payment, minus income received from 
owning the security or damages from the issuer or offeror.
154
  
Registration of securities in Arkansas requires that numerous 
documents be filed with the Arkansas Securities Department, 
along with various fees.
155
 
If a cryptoasset meets the definition of an investment 
contract it is subject to the securities laws and any sale must be 
registered or exempt.
156
  Registration is expensive and 
151. Under the Arkansas Securities Act, a security is:
any: (i) [n]ote; (ii) [s]tock; (iii) [t]reasury stock; (iv) [b]ond; (v) [d]ebenture;
(vi) [e]vidence of indebtedness; (vii) [c]ertificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement; (viii) [c]ollateral-trust certificate; (ix)
[p]reorganization certificate or subscription; (x) [t]ransferable share; (xi)
[i]nvestment contract; (xii) [v]ariable annuity contract; (xiii) [l]ife settlement
contract or fractionalized or pooled interest in a life settlement contract; (xiv)
[v]oting-trust certificate; (xv) [c]ertificate of deposit for a security; (xvi)
[c]ertificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or
in payments out of production under such a title or lease; or (xvii) [i]n general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’ or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-102 (17)(A) (2019). 
152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-104(b) (1997).
153. ARK. CODE ANN § 23-42-104(c).
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-106(a) (2017).
155. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-42-403 to -404 (2011 & 2019) for more information
on Arkansas securities registration requirements. 
156. See Mitra, supra note 134.
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burdensome and there are a limited number of exemptions.
157
  
The only presently available alternative is to argue that the 
cryptoassets in question are not investment contracts, which may 
be very difficult to do successfully.
158
 
The SEC and federal courts use the Howey test for 
investment contracts,
159
 which includes any:  
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his 
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits 
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it 
being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are 
evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in 
the physical assets employed in the enterprise.160 
Arkansas, however, follows a different approach. 
B. Arkansas’s Risk Capital Test
Arkansas courts have taken a more expansive approach to 
defining an investment contract than the Howey test.161  In Schultz 
v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., the Arkansas Supreme Court cited
the Hawaii and Minnesota approaches to defining an investment
contract.
162
  Their approach for determining when an investment
contract exists is known as the “risk capital” test. 
163
  Hawaii holds
that an investment contract exists when:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of
the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the
offeror’s promises or representations which give rise to a
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some
kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the
offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
157. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-42-403 to -404.
158. See infra Part II.B.
159. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
160. Id.
161. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 777-78, 552 S.W.2d 4, 8-9
(1977). 
162. Id. at 779-80, 552 S.W.2d at 9-10.
163. Carol R. Goforth, Treatment of LLC Membership Interests Under the Arkansas
Securities Act, 1998 ARK. L. NOTES 33, 34-35. 
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(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical
and actual control over the managerial decisions of the
enterprise.164
In Schultz, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained that the 
definition of an investment contract “should be flexible enough to 
encompass the endless succession of new and innovative or old 
and tried promotional schemes, where the promoters, by design, 
seek to risk the money or property of others in their venture.”
165
  
The Arkansas Supreme Court also cited the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, which had previously recognized that the Howey 
test is not the only approach for defining an investment 
contract.
166
  The Minnesota Supreme Court found the Howey test 
to be both “rigid” and “definitive,” and acknowledged that while 
it “is useful in identifying most ‘investment contracts,’” the court 
decided that the Howey test should not be the exclusive test for 
identifying an investment contract in Minnesota.
167
  According to 
the Minnesota court, in a case that preceded the Securities Act of 
1933 by thirteen years, the securities laws are a necessary exercise 
of the state’s police powers and should be given a broad 
construction, “for it was the evident purpose of the Legislature to 
bring within the statute the sale of all securities not specifically 
exempted[,]” and “[i]t is better to determine in each instance 
whether a security is in fact of such a character as fairly to fall 
within the scope of the statute.”
168
   
The Arkansas Supreme Court cited this view of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court approvingly, finding that the definition 
of a security under the Arkansas Securities Act should not be 
construed narrowly; rather “ it is better to determine in each 
instance from a review of all of the facts, whether an investment 
scheme or plan constitutes an investment contract, or a certificate 
of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement, within 
the scope of the statute.”
169
   
164. State v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971).
165. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 777, 552 S.W.2d at 8.
166. State v. Invs. Sec. Corp., 209 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 1973).
167. Id.
168. State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920).
169. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 781, 552 S.W.2d at 10.
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The relevant facts in Schultz were as follows: the putative 
investment contracts were partnership interests in a joint venture 
organized by the sellers to construct an apartment complex, and 
it was to be a tax shelter for those who supplied the equity for the 
project.
170
  The court found that the interests in the joint venture 
were securities under the Arkansas Securities Act.
171
   
The venture was merely a tax shelter for the investors; they 
performed no management duties and had virtually no 
responsibilities in the operations of the venture.
172
  The 
“[i]nvestors were mere passive contributors of risk capital who 
placed their money in an investment program” and risked its loss 
in the venture.
173
  The takeaway from Schultz is that in Arkansas, 
a passive investment with hopes of realizing capital gains will 
constitute a security under the Arkansas Securities Act, because 
“regardless of labels, the Arkansas Securities Act was designed 
to protect both investors in common stock and those persons who 
in substance are the investors in the disguised business venture of 
another.”
174
   
Ten years later, in Casali v. Schultz, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court answered a similar question regarding whether the sale of 
a unit in a partnership interest constituted a security.
175
  The sale 
worked as follows: a group of investors, including the appellees, 
contributed capital into a partnership to purchase an investment 
banking house.
176
  The sale of the partnership units constituted a 
security under Arkansas law because the partnership units were, 
again, a passive investment: the investors could not hire or fire 
employees, set salaries, mortgage property, open bank accounts, 
sign checks, incur any debts, sell any assets, or say how the stock 
would be voted.
177
  Like the Schultz case, the investors in Casali 
had no management authority in the business, but contributed 
capital that was subject to the risks of the venture.
178
   
170. Id. at 772, 552 S.W.2d at 6.
171. Id. at 781, 552 S.W.2d at 10-11.
172. Id. at 782-83, 552 S.W.2d at 11.
173. Id. at 782, 552 S.W.2d at 11.
174. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 777, 552 S.W.2d at 8.
175. Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602, 603, 732 S.W.2d 836, 836 (1987).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 604, 732 S.W.2d at 837.
178. Id.; Schultz, 261 Ark. at 782, 552 S.W.2d at 11.
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The court used the risk capital test from Schultz, finding that 
it did not matter that the arrangement was labeled a general 
partnership interest, but rather the court looked to the “underlying 
economic substance,” or “economic reality,” of the arrangement 
to determine if it was a security.
179
  Whether or not a particular 
arrangement is a security in Arkansas is a “flexible concept” that 
“should be liberally construed to afford protection to the 
public.”
180
 
The Arkansas Court of Appeals has used a slightly varied 
approach to defining an investment contract.  In Smith v. 
Arkansas, the court adopted a five-part test to determine whether 
a particular purchase constituted an investment contract.
181
  
Under this test, for a transaction to constitute an investment 
contract, there must be: 
(1) the investment of money or money’s worth;
(2) investment in a venture;
(3) the expectation of some benefit to the investor as a result
of the investment;
(4) contribution towards the risk capital of the venture; and
(5) the absence of direct control over the investment or
policy decisions concerning the venture.182
While the verbiage is different, the Arkansas Supreme Court, 
as well as the Eighth Circuit, has found that the Smith test is 
“substantially similar” to the Howey test the federal courts use.183  
The issue then, is whether the Schultz approach and the Smith 
approach are used independently of one other and, if so, when? 
The Arkansas Supreme Court has shed some light on this 
issue in subsequent cases.  In Cook v. Wills, the court cited the 
Smith five-factor test, but also cited Schultz for the proposition 
179. Casali, 292 Ark. at 605-06, 732 S.W.2d at 837-38.
180. Id. at 605, 732 S.W.2d at 837.
181. Smith v. State, 266 Ark. 861, 865, 587 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Ct. App. 1979).  This test
was attributed to a law review article written by Professor Joseph Long.  Id at 864-65; 587 
S.W.2d 50, 52; Joseph C. Long, An Attempt to Return “Investment Contracts” to the 
Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 174 (1971). 
182. Smith, 266 Ark. at 865, 587 S.W.2d at 52.
183. Union Nat’l Bank of Little Rock v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 885 (8th Cir.
1986); Grand Prairie Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Worthen Bank & Tr. Co., 298 Ark. 542, 545, 769 
S.W.2d 20, 22 (1989). 
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that “the definition of what constitutes a security must necessarily 
depend on an analysis of all of the factors in any given 
transaction.”
184
  The court did not go into much detail about the 
different analyses in the Smith versus Schultz approach, finding 
that since the plaintiffs provided skill and expertise to the business 
venture, it could “hardly be categorized as a lack of control” and 
was enough for the interest not to constitute a security.
185
 
A similar result in Carder v. Burrow: the court recognized 
the flexible and broad approach to defining an investment 
contract under Schultz, concluding that the transaction at issue 
“was an ordinary secured commercial loan” rather than the sale 
of a security since there was no expectation of “profit.”
186
  The 
court seems to take “benefit” to mean “profit,” whereas it is 
plausible, particularly in the crypto context, that a purchaser may 
receive a “benefit” that would not necessarily be considered a 
“profit.”
187
  “Pursuant to the Smith factors, investors must expect 
some ‘benefit,’ or profit, from the transaction.”
188
  A benefit could 
be construed as being broader than a profit, so as benefit has been 
interpreted to be synonymous with profit, the Smith test is 
narrower than the all-inclusive Schultz approach.   
The most recent case examining the Smith/Schultz 
approaches to defining an investment contract is Waters v. 
Millsap.189  In Waters, the Arkansas Securities Commissioner 
argued that the Smith test is not the exclusive test for determining 
if a transaction is a security under Arkansas law, and instead 
asked the court to adopt the “Family Resemblance Test” that the 
184. Cook v. Wills, 305 Ark. 442, 447, 808 S.W.2d 758, 761 (1991).
185. Id.
186. Carder v. Burrow, 327 Ark. 545, 550-51, 940 S.W.2d 429, 432 (1997).
187. Id. at 549-50, 940 S.W.2d at 431.
Pursuant to the Smith factors, investors must expect some ‘benefit,’ or profit, 
from the transaction.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals . . . examined the 
Arkansas Securities Act and determined that a fixed rate of interest payable at 
fixed times did not constitute the ‘expectation of benefit’ needed to make a 
note a security because it did not give the holder ‘an opportunity for either 
capital appreciation or participation in the earnings’ of the company. 
Id. (citing First Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. E.F. Hutton Mortg. Corp., 834 F.2d 685, 689 
(8th Cir. 1987)). 
188. Id. at 549, 940 S.W.2d at 431.
189. Waters v. Millsap, 2015 Ark. 272, 465 S.W.3d 851 (2015).
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U.S. Supreme Court has adopted.
190
  The Arkansas Supreme 
Court declined to adopt the Family Resemblance Test because it 
was unnecessary to do so: the Family Resemblance Test factors 
are encompassed within the “flexible, all-inclusive Schultz 
test.”
191
   
The court deemed the Smith factors “instructive” but never 
to be relied on exclusively, instead citing the Schultz case to stand 
for the proposition that a review of all the facts is required to 
determine if an instrument is a security.
192
  The case was 
remanded on the grounds that the lower court had only considered 
the Smith factors without taking into account Schultz and factors 
such as the sophistication of the parties to the transaction.
193
  
While the Smith factors are instructive, the court found “that the 
all-inclusive nature of the Schultz test is better suited to the 
purposes of the [Arkansas Securities] Act.”
194
 
C. Many Functional Cryptoassets are Likely Securities
Under Arkansas Law 
Under Arkansas case law, both with the line of cases using 
the risk capital test as well as Professor Long’s five-part test, it is 
likely that most cryptoassets will be treated as securities 
regardless of whether they are pre-functional or fully 
functional.
195
  The Arkansas courts use a broader definition of an 
investment contract than used by federal courts under Howey.196  
Though the arrangements in Schultz and Casali would most likely 
have been securities under the Howey test as well, the court 
specifically noted the definition of a security needed to be 
190. Id. at 2, 465 S.W.3d at 852.  Under the Second Circuit’s “‘family resemblance’
test,” an issuer can “rebut the presumption that a note is a security if it can show that the note 
in question ‘bears a strong family resemblance’ to an item on the . . . list of exceptions, . . . 
or convinces the court to add a new instrument to the list.”  Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 
U.S. 56, 64 (1990) (first citing Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 
1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1976); and then citing Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 
930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984)) (alterations adopted).  
191. Waters, 2015 Ark. at 13, 465 S.W.3d at 858.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 13, 465 S.W.3d at 858-59.
194. Id. at 13, 465 S.W.3d at 858.
195. See supra Part II.B.
196. See infra Part II.B.
656 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:3 
“flexible,” “liberally construed,” and broad “enough to 
encompass the endless succession of new and innovative . . . 
promotional schemes.”
197
  The risk capital test requires neither 
commonality, an expectation of profits, nor that profits be solely 
derived from the efforts of others, so many more cryptoassets will 
be regulated under securities laws in jurisdictions like Arkansas 
using the risk capital test than those using the Howey test.198   
The first prong of the risk capital test is that the offeree must 
furnish some initial value to an offeror.
199
  The purchaser of a 
cryptoasset generally furnishes some value to the offeror in order 
to receive the cryptoasset, whether it be in the form of fiat 
currency or another cryptoasset.
200
   
There is a notable situation where this would not be the case: 
airdrops.  Airdrops occur when a crypto company distributes its 
tokens to certain user wallets for free.
201
  Airdrops are done to 
generate awareness and create buzz around a new crypto 
project.
202
  Since the offerees receive the tokens free of charge, 
they have yet to furnish any value to the offeror and thus this 
would fail the first prong of the risk capital test.   
The second prong of the risk capital test requires that “a 
portion of this initial value” be “subjected to the risks of the 
enterprise.”
203
  In the case of an ICO, tokens are generally sold 
before they are functional because money generated in an ICO 
funds completion of the project.
204
  This means that the purchaser 
assumes the risk of the business failing to properly develop a 
functional asset and losing the money invested.
205
  Even for 
functional tokens, there is some level of risk involved if the token 
197. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 777-78, 552 S.W.2d 4, 8-9
(1977); Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602, 605, 732 S.W.2d 836, 837 (1987). 
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 780, 552 S.W.2d at 10 (quoting State v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc.,
485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971)). 
200. Kira Egorova, Crypto Exchanges, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (July 10, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/F3BA-SP8M]. 
201. Kayalyse.io, What Are “Airdrops” in Crypto World?, MEDIUM (Feb. 15, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/K557-FQ56]. 
202. Id.
203. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 780, 552 S.W.2d at 10 (citing Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d
at 109). 
204. See BITCOIN MAG., supra note 103.
205. See id.
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does not perform as promised or if something about the network 
does not function properly, among other concerns.
206
  In either 
case, the value given by the offeree is subject to the risks of the 
enterprise, however large or small those risks may be.   
The third prong requires that “the furnishing of the initial 
value” be “induced by the offeror’s promises or representations 
which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable 
benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue 
to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise.”
207
  
This means that the purchaser of the cryptoasset must have a 
reasonable understanding that the benefit he or she receives from 
purchasing it is greater than the initial value he or she gave for 
it.
208
  This is always met for sales involving pre-functional tokens 
or contractual rights to purchase tokens when completed because 
investors would not offer money for an incomplete project if they 
did not expect to gain some benefit upon completion.
209
 
This third prong is likely met in situations involving 
functional tokens as well.  Many tokens are marketed with the 
expectation that they can be resold at a profit, particularly when 
early round purchasers are given a discount from the final round 
price.
210
  The ability to participate in the network, as tokens allow, 
is probably worth more to offerees and offers them some value 
above what they gave for the token or they would not have 
purchased the tokens in the first place.
211
   
The fourth prong requires that “the offeree does not receive 
the right to exercise practical and actual control over the 
managerial decision[s] of the enterprise.”
212
  Certainly, individual 
206. See Park, supra note 121.
207. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 780, 552 S.W.2d at 10 (quoting Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485
P.2d at 109).
208. See id. at 782-83, 552 S.W.3d at 11; see also Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d at
110. 
209. See Muhammed Kus, A Critical Review of U.S. Securities Laws and the Status
of Initial Coin Offerings: Potential Solutions for Issuers 31 (Dec. 2018) (L.L.M. thesis, 
Maurer School of Law, Indiana University) (on file with the Jerome Hall Law Library, 
Indiana University). 
210. See Cryptonite, How to Profit from Cryptocurrency, HACKERNOON (Apr. 20,
2019), [https://perma.cc/QE6B-2LMG]. 
211. See Kus, supra note 209, at 27.
212. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 780, 552 S.W.2d at 10 (quoting Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485
P.2d at 109).
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purchasers of cryptoassets have no control over the programming 
of the platform or execution of any smart contracts.
213
  The 
platform is created by the company launching the token, and 
because the networks are decentralized, once launched, individual 
purchasers have no practical ability to modify the arrangement.
214
  
If, for example, the token provides the purchaser with cloud 
storage or access to an internet browser with no advertisements, 
the token owner has no real control over the service offered; 
rather, the token merely gives access to that functionality.
215
 
Under the Schultz test, there is a high probability that most 
cryptoassets constitute securities within its broad definition.
216
  It 
would thus be illegal to sell those assets in Arkansas, or to 
Arkansas residents, without first registering the securities in 
Arkansas or obtaining an exemption from registration under state 
law.
217
  While it is not certain that every cryptoasset will be a 
security under Arkansas law, it is also not certain that they would 
not be.
218
  This uncertainty is a problem for entrepreneurs 
interested in exploring this technology.
219
  If crypto entrepreneurs 
are looking to set up shop in a certain state, they will choose states 
with favorable regulatory regimes, or at the very least, states with 
clear regulatory regimes.
220
  At this time, Arkansas has neither as 
its risk capital approach is much more ambiguous and amorphous 
than the Howey test used by many other states.221  Regulatory 
uncertainty stifles innovation.
222
  Creating an exemption for fully 
functional cryptoassets would provide regulatory certainty and 
incentivize crypto businesses to choose Arkansas.   
213. See Andrew Young, Crypto Network Fundamentals, MEDIUM (Dec. 19, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/7GXM-HFEL]. 
214. See id.
215. See id.; see Park, supra note 121.
216. See supra Part II.C.
217. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-42-403 to -404 (2011 & 2019).  This excludes
transactions that are preempted under federal law, such as transactions that are registered 
under federal law, or those under certain exemptions.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-509 (2019). 
218. See The Risk Capital Test - List of States, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES L. CTR,
[https://perma.cc/S3VB-6TEN] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
219. See Park, supra note 121.
220. See infra Part III.A.
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See Jeff, US Regulatory Uncertainty is Stifling Innovation - Fact or Fiction?,
HACKERNOON (Aug. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/8T6J-W877]. 
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Wyoming resolved the risk that such cryptoassets would be 
tokens under the Wyoming risk capital test, and provided 
regulatory certainty to entrepreneurs, by adopting a formal 
exemption from the securities registration requirement.
223
  
Cryptoassets continue to be subject to state anti-fraud laws, but 
the uncertainty as to whether it is necessary to find an exemption 
from the state registration requirements is resolved.
224
 
D. Arkansas’s Activity Regarding Cryptoassets
1. Arkansas Securities Department No-Action Letters
On July 18, 2018, the Arkansas Securities Department issued
a No-Action Letter to CEX.IO LTD which stated that staff would 
not recommend that the Department take an enforcement action 
against the company if it did not seek a license under the Arkansas 
Uniform Money Services Act (UMSA).
225
  CEX.IO LTD, a 
crypto exchange established in 2013 and available in forty-three 
states, “make[s] fiat-to-crypto transactions accessible by offering 
card payments and bank transfers to the[ir] clients.”
226
 
On September 5, 2018, the Arkansas Securities Department 
also issued a No-Action Letter to Bucket Technologies, Inc. 
(Bucket) which stated that staff would not recommend that the 
Department take an enforcement action against the company if it 
did not obtain a UMSA license.
227
  Bucket is “a digital piggy bank 
platform” that integrates with existing point-of-sale systems at 
retail locations to facilitate coinless cash transactions.
228
  Bucket 
uses blockchain software and is free to retailers.
229
  Upon 
customer request, it allows the cashier to press a button that says 
223. SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES L. CTR, supra note 218; H.B. 0070, 64th Leg., Budget
Sess. (Wyo. 2018); H.B. 0062, 65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019). 
224. Wyo. H.B. 0062.
225. CEX.IO LTD, Ark. Sec. Dep’t No-Action Letter No. 18-NA-0006 (July 18,
2018), [https://perma.cc/VW65-YKSG]. 
226. About Us, CEX.IO, [https://perma.cc/3NGK-YWQ4] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
227. Bucket Technologies, Inc., Ark. Sec. Dep’t No-Action Letter No. 18-NA-0003
(Sept. 5, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7LC4-GVKQ]. 
228. Bucket Technologies, CRUNCHBASE, [https://perma.cc/HT6C-RMAP] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
229. Kim Souza, The Supply Side: Bucket Technologies Ready for Retail by Mid-
January, TALK BUS. & POL. (Jan. 3, 2019), [https://perma.cc/Q379-3Z74]. 
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“bucket the change” and give a receipt with a QR code that can 
be scanned on a phone to access the customer’s account.
230
  The 
customer can then transfer the funds to his or her bank account 
once he or she has “bucketed” fifty dollars.
231
   
2. Previous Legislation
As of early 2020, the Arkansas legislature has passed only 
one law regarding blockchain technology.
232
  Act 1061 of 2019, 
“An Act Concerning Blockchain Technology; and for Other 
Purposes,” amends the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 
(UETA) to include records obtained via blockchain 
technology.
233
  This Act says that signatures “secured through 
blockchain technology” are “considered to be in electronic form 
and an electronic signature.”
234
  It also says “[a] record or contract 
that is secured through blockchain technology” is “considered to 
be in electronic form and an electronic record,” and that “[a] smart 
contract shall be considered a commercial contract” and “shall not 
be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability.”
235
  
This Act has been highly criticized.  An American Bar 
Association article over the law, titled Another Bad Blockchain 
Bill, commented that “[u]nlike a computer program, [Act 1061] 
defies logic.”
236
  This article’s criticism of the Act points out that 
claims made about blockchain technology within the Act are 
untrue, no actual existing blockchain meets the blockchain 
definition in the Act, signatures and records stored on a 
blockchain already meet the UETA definitions, and no smart 
contract meets the smart contract definition in the Act, among 
other deficiencies.
237
  Andrew Hinkes, a nationally recognized 
attorney for cryptocurrency-related legal issues, and one of 
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Heather Morton, Blockchain 2019 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATORS (July 23, 2019), [https://perma.cc/DK6P-BPTB]. 
233. H.B. 1944, 92nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-
32-122 (2019).
234. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122(b).
235. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122(c).
236. William Denny, Another Bad Blockchain Bill, A.B.A. (May 1, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/4FW8-N8UM]. 
237. Id.
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CoinDesks’s Most Influential People in Blockchain in 2017,
238
 
tweeted “#Arkansas gives its UETA the ‘bad #blockchain 
definition’ treatment with A.C.A. § 25-32-122; no existing 
system fits the #blockchain definition, and now any contract is 
enforceable & valid if it contains a ‘smart contract term’ in 
Arkansas!”
239
 
III. A WAY FORWARD - CREATING AN
EXEMPTION FOR FULLY FUNCTIONAL UTILITY 
TOKENS 
A. Wyoming - A Crypto Leader
Wyoming has been at the forefront of innovation-friendly 
legislative efforts in the regulation of cryptoassets.  As of 2019, 
Wyoming has enacted at least thirteen different laws regarding 
cryptoassets, a space where few states have acted.
240
  It is the only 
state with a truly comprehensive pro-crypto legal framework.
241
  
The benefit of adopting a pro-crypto legal framework is that it 
encourages technological innovation, which can lead to an influx 
of capital, jobs, and revenue.
242
   
Wyoming has been particularly forward-thinking with its 
legislation providing exemptions from state securities laws for 
certain cryptoassets and the state has been heralded as the 
“Delaware of digital asset law.”
243
  Wyoming was also the first to 
legally recognize both uncertificated and certificated blockchain 
shares of stock.
244
  When it comes to considering how Arkansas 
might adopt some of the same forward-looking approaches, 
238. Andrew Hinkes, NYU STERN, [https://perma.cc/9L8Z-S2TT] (last visited Sept.
30, 2020). 
239. Drew Hinkes (@propelforward), TWITTER (Aug. 15, 2019, 9:03 AM),
[https://perma.cc/NTG3-FV2P]. 
240. Caitlin Long, What Do Wyoming’s 13 New Blockchain Laws Mean?, FORBES
(Mar. 4, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PM9R-6HG5]. 
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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looking at whether the State’s securities laws should be amended 
is a practical starting point.
245
 
The 2018 Wyoming legislation is titled “Open blockchain 
tokens-exemptions.”
246
  It states that “a developer or seller of an 
open blockchain token shall not be deemed the issuer of a 
security” if the developer “files a notice of intent with the 
secretary of state, . . . the token is for a consumptive purpose,” 
and the token was not sold to the purchaser as a financial 
investment.
247
  In order for the token to have not been sold as a 
financial investment, the following attributes are important: (1) 
the token developer or seller must reasonably believe that the 
token is sold for a “consumptive purpose;” (2) at the time of sale, 
the token must already have a consumptive purpose; (3) the initial 
buyer must be prevented from selling the token until it has a 
consumptive purpose; or (4) the developer or seller must take 
“reasonable precautions” to ensure the token is not purchased as 
a financial investment.
248
  As such, this law creates two categories 
of cryptoassets: those that are financial investments (which will 
be regulated as securities), and those that are sold for their 
consumptive value (which will not be regulated as securities 
under the state blue sky laws).
249
   
The Wyoming law protects more than issuers.  Persons who 
assist in transactions involving crypto are exempt from being 
treated as securities brokers or dealers if they “file[] a notice of 
intent with the secretary of state,” they have a “reasonable and 
good faith belief that [the] token subject to exchange” meets the 
utility token exemption requirements, and they take “reasonably 
prompt action to terminate” a token exchange that does not meet 
these requirements.
250
  
Wyoming’s pro-crypto regulatory regime has had a 
noticeable effect.  Dozens of limited liability companies (LLCs) 
have already registered in Wyoming with “blockchain” or 
245. See, e.g., Errol Villorente, California Bill Seeks to Amend Securities Law to
Exempt Some Cryptocurrencies, MICKY (May. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9EPW-FMCH]. 
246. H.B. 0070, 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018).
247. Wyo. H.B. 0070(a).
248. Wyo. H.B. 0070.
249. See Wyo. H.B. 0070.
250. Wyo. H.B. 0070.
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“crypto” in their names.
251
  Similar action in Arkansas is likely to 
yield similar results.  
B. A Survey of Legislative Activity in Other States
Exempting Utility Tokens 
Montana exempted utility tokens from its state securities 
laws in May 2019.
252
  Montana defines a utility token as a digital 
unit created “in response to the verification or collection of a 
specified number of transactions relating to a digital ledger or 
database; . . . by deploying computer code to a blockchain 
network that allows for the creation of digital tokens or other 
units;” or some combination of those methods.
253
  It must be:  
recorded in a digital ledger or database that is chronological, 
consensus-based, decentralized, and mathematically verified in 
nature, especially relating to the supply of units and their 
distribution; . . . capable of being exchanged or transferred 
between persons without an intermediary or custodian; and . . . 
issued to allow the holder of the digital unit access to a good or 
service delivered by the issuer without vesting the holder with any 
ownership interest or equity interest in the issuer.
254
   
A token is exempt from registration if it meets the following 
requirements: the token’s purpose is primarily consumptive; the 
issuer markets the token for a consumptive purpose and not a 
“speculative or investment purpose; . . . the issuer files a notice of 
intent . . . with the securities commissioner;” and the “utility 
token is available at the time of sale,” or certain other conditions 
are met.
255
  A “consumptive purpose” requires that the purpose of 
the token is “to provide or receive goods, services, or content 
including access to goods, services, or content.”
256
 
251. Gregory Barber, The Newest Haven for Cryptocurrency Companies? Wyoming,
WIRED (June 13, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2VZW-TFEB]. 
252. Jeremy Wall, Montana: Utility Tokens Are Not Securities, Joins Colorado And
Wyoming Crypto Friendly States, INV. IN BLOCKCHAIN (May 25, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/243K-4SPY].  
253. H.B. 584, 66th Leg., 2019 Sess. (Mont. 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-
105(23)(c)(ii)(A) (2019). 
254. Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(c)(ii)(B-D); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-
105(23)(c)(ii)(B-D). 
255. Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-105(23)(a).
256. Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(c)(i); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-105(23)(c)(i).
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If a functional token is not available at the time of sale, the 
following conditions must be met: “the consumptive purpose of 
the . . . token is available within 180 days after . . . sale or transfer; 
. . . the initial buyer is prohibited from reselling or transferring the 
. . . token until the consumptive purpose . . . is available;” and 
“the initial buyer provides a knowing and clear acknowledgment 
that the initial buyer is purchasing the . . . token with the primary 
intent to use the . . . token for a consumptive purpose and not for 
a speculative or investment purpose.”
257
   
There are some clear similarities between the Wyoming and 
Montana exemptions, primarily in classifying the exempt tokens 
by their consumptive purpose.  Both the Wyoming exemption and 
the Montana exemption prevent the initial buyer from reselling or 
transferring the token until the consumptive purpose is available 
unless certain conditions are met.
258
 
Colorado has also adopted similar legislation.  The 
“Colorado Digital Token Act” justifies the exemption for utility 
tokens due to the “costs and complexities of state securities 
registration” that “can outweigh the benefits” for crypto-
businesses, the regulatory uncertainties facing crypto businesses 
under Colorado’s securities laws, and to promote the formation 
and growth of local companies and jobs.
259
  The exemption 
requires that the issuer “file[] a notice of intent with the securities 
commissioner,” the primary purpose of the token be consumptive, 
the token issuer markets it for a consumptive purpose rather than 
for a “speculative or investment purpose,” and “the consumptive 
purpose of the . . . token is available at the time of sale,” or certain 
conditions must be met.
260
  If the consumptive purpose is not 
available at the time of sale, it must be available within 180 days 
of sale or transfer, the initial buyer cannot transfer or resell the 
token until the consumptive purpose is available, and the initial 
buyer must provide “a knowing and clear acknowledgment” that 
he or she is purchasing the token “with the primary intent to use 
257. Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(a)(iv); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-105(23)(a)(iv).
258. Compare Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(a)(iv) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-
105(23)(a)(iv) (2019) with H.B. 0070 § 1(a)(iii)(B), 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018). 
259. S.B. 19-023 § 1(2)(b-c) (Colo. 2019) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-
308.7 (2019)). 
260. Colo. S.B. 19-023 § 1(c)(3).
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the . . . token for a consumptive purpose and not a speculative or 
investment purpose.”
261
 
Arizona’s legislation exempted certain “[v]irtual coin 
offering[s]” from state securities laws, defining “virtual coin” as 
“a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and 
that functions as a medium of exchange, unit of account and store 
of value.”
262
  The exemption does not apply to coins marketed as 
an investment or coins that do not grant the coin purchaser “the 
right to use, contribute to the development of or license the use of 
a platform using blockchain technology . . . including a license to 
use a product or service on the platform or a discount against fees 
for use of the platform” within ninety days of receiving the 
coin.
263
 
C. An Arkansas Exemption
The Arkansas legislature should adopt an exemption akin to 
those adopted in Wyoming, Montana, and Colorado.  The 
Montana and Colorado legislatures use a narrower definition of a 
security than Arkansas and yet those states found it necessary to 
create an exemption for utility tokens.
264
  If states that use a 
narrower definition of an investment contract than Arkansas 
261. Colo. S.B. 19-023 § 1(c)(3)(V).
262. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1801(31), -1844(G) (2018).
263. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1801(32)(b).
264. “In a recent conversation with Montana State Auditor Matt Rosendale and Deputy
Securities Commissioner Lynne Egan, both echoed the Howey test as the standard the state 
would use to determine whether a virtual currency would fall under the scrutiny of Montana 
securities laws.”  Jerrod Bevan & Crowley Fleck, How Much Do Lawyers Need to Know 
About Bitcoin?, MONT. LAW., Apr. 2018, at 12, 15. 
[I]n the Colorado state courts, unlike the Tenth Circuit, the test for an
investment contract may be more demanding.  The element of ‘common
enterprise’ may be more difficult to satisfy because it may require: (1) more
than the involvement of a third party; and (2) a benefit derived from the
involvement not only of a third party, but other investors as well. . . . [T]he
Colorado Securities Act parallels the federal securities acts and the state courts
follow the federal circuits in the interpretation of the language of the state and
federal acts.
S. Scott Lasher & Eric B. Liebman, The Application of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. in Colorado
and Other Jurisdictions, COLO. LAW., June 2002, at 73, 77 (emphasis added).
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found it necessary to exempt utility tokens, it is certainly 
necessary in Arkansas, which uses the broad risk capital test.
265
  
This Comment suggests that Arkansas should exempt fully 
functional cryptoassets, rather than simply “utility tokens.”  As 
mentioned previously, utility tokens that are not fully functional 
may, and probably do, constitute securities, even under the Howey 
test, and simply labeling something a “utility token” does not 
mean it is not also a security.
266
  Arkansas courts look at the 
“economic reality” of an arrangement rather than labels to 
determine if the securities laws apply, and would do so in the 
crypto context as well.
267
  Including functionality as a requisite 
for exemption provides greater certainty as to which tokens are 
exempt and greater protection for consumers as pre-functional 
tokens typically are sold based on speculative future increases in 
value.
268
  “Crypoassets” is a term intended to be broader than the 
term “utility tokens,” as used in the other exemptions, thereby 
providing exemptions for a greater number of crypto 
companies.
269
  
Arkansas is poised to become a more business-friendly state, 
and creating this exemption is consistent with the policy goals of 
the state in 2020.
270
  In 2019, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson 
created the Arkansas Innovation Council to develop and expand 
Arkansas’s “technology-driven economy.”
271
  Arkansas was the 
first state to pass a comprehensive law requiring public and 
charter high schools to offer computer science classes.
272
  There 
was a 160.3% increase in Arkansas students receiving computer 
265. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 780, 552 S.W.2d 4, 10
(citing State v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971)). 
266. “ICOs, or more specifically tokens, can be called a variety of names, but merely
calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some utility does not prevent the 
token from being a security.”  SEC, supra note 114; see also supra Part I (F)-(G).  
267. See Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602, 605-06, 732 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1987).
268. See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 116, at 11.
269. See supra text accompanying note 3.
270. Governor Announces Arkansas Innovation Council to Expand State’s
Knowledge-Based Economy, TALK BUS. & POL. (Feb. 12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/J3WL-
FXZN]. 
271. Id.
272. Issie Lapowsky, So, Arkansas Is Leading the Learn to Code Movement, WIRED
(Mar. 28, 2015), [https://perma.cc/NP8T-D374]. 
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science degrees from 2014 to 2018.
273
  Arkansas is also ranked 
third for the lowest cost of doing business.
274
   
Arkansas has the potential to become a technology hub and 
lawmakers are taking action to attract tech companies and grow 
tech talent within the state.
275
  Creating an innovation-friendly 
environment for crypto companies is consistent with the positive 
changes that are already taking place.  States that have exempted 
utility tokens have already seen the positive results, as they have 
increased their ability to attract crypto businesses to their state.
276
  
In a state committed to developing tech talent, legislation that will 
attract blockchain businesses should be a priority.  
CONCLUSION 
Arkansas has a lot of work to do to move up the list from 
being the forty-fourth best state for technology and innovation 
with a grade of “F,” but exempting fully functional cryptoassets 
from Arkansas securities laws is a small yet significant step 
towards doing so.  This is a step towards transforming Arkansas 
into a crypto-friendly state and a necessary change for creating a 
comprehensive, innovation-forward regulatory framework for 
cryptoassets.  The tides are already turning as other states are 
adopting similar legislation, and Arkansas should act while it is 
still early enough to retain the benefits of being a leader in this 
space.   
273. Tech Industry Report, ARK. INC. 5, [https://perma.cc/8RB5-7ZFK] (last visited
Sept. 17, 2020). 
274. Id. at 17.
275. TALK BUS. & POL., supra note 270.
276. Barber, supra note 251.
